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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent socially-aware applications leverage users’ social information to provide features such as
filtering restaurant recommendations based on reviews by friends (e.g., Yelp), recommending email
recipients or filtering spam based on previous email activity [Kong et al. 2006], and exploiting social
incentives for computer resource sharing [Li and Dabek 2006; Nguyen et al. 2008]. Social informa-
tion is also leveraged in conjunction with location and collocation data in mobile applications such
as Loopt and Foursquare, which collect, store, and use sensitive geosocial information.
The state of the art is to collect and manage such information within an application, thus offering
social functionalities limited only to the context of the application, as in the examples above, or to
expose this information from platforms that specifically collect and manage it, such as online social
networks (OSNs). For example, Facebook1 and OpenSocial2 allow 3rd-party application developers
and websites to access the social information and activity of millions of users. However, hidden in-
centives for users to have many OSN “friends” lead to declarations of contacts with little connection
in terms of trust, common interests, shared objectives, or other such manifestations of real social re-
lationships [Golder et al. 2007]. Thus, an application that tries to provide targeted functionalities
using social information exposed by current OSNs must wade through a lot of noise.
This paper presents Prometheus, a peer-to-peer (P2P) service that collects social information
from multiple sources and enables a wide range of new socially-aware applications to mine it via
an API that implements social inferences. This service collects information from actual interactions
between users within multiple environments and under multiple identities (e.g., OSNs, email, mobile
phones). Thus, it maintains richer and more nuanced social information than current OSNs or social
applications, which can lead to more accurate inferences of trust, interests, and context. Prometheus
represents social information as a directed, weighted and labeled multi-graph distributed on a P2P
platform. Access to such aggregated information is controlled by user-defined policies.
1http://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/api
2http://opensocial.org/
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The choice of a P2P architecture was motivated by two factors: user privacy and service availabil-
ity. Two alternatives could be considered: a centralized service, and a decentralized service running
on mobile phones. Companies such as Google and Facebook already perform centralized aggre-
gation of user data from independent services. However, they have no incentives or appropriate
business models to allow users full control over their data. Additionally, some OSNs institute par-
ticularly draconian policies concerning the ownership of user-contributed information and content.
For example, users cannot delete their data from the Facebook servers and they cannot easily export
their data to a competitive service. Furthermore, users must trust their OSN provider for complying
with privacy policies related to sharing data with 3rd parties. However, the recent scandal of NSA’s
unauthorized snooping of millions of users’ data from such companies [Gellman and Poitras 2013;
TheGuardian 2014] is yet another proof of Big Brother monitoring. In contrast, a decentralized
service that gives users full control of how their private information is aggregated and accessed is
desirable.
An alternative architecture is to store social information in a fully decentralized manner on users’
mobile devices, as proposed in [Mokhtar et al. 2009; Pietila¨inen et al. 2009; Sarigol et al. 2010;
Toninelli et al. 2011]. In this architecture, a mobile device stores its user’s egonet: all the relevant
social encounters of its user with others. However, research [Benevenuto et al. 2009; Jiang et al.
2010] found that 30 to 70% of requests in OSNs, such as for viewing profiles or sending messages,
came not from direct social contacts, but from neighbors at least 2 hops away in the social graph.
Such requests could not be satisfied solely from the information stored in egonets. Thus, more
infrastructure would be needed to allow gathering of data from other mobile devices, therefore,
including issues related to access, online presence, and limited resources (especially battery).
These aspects led us to opt for an in-between architecture for Prometheus, fully decentralized but
capable to aggregate groups of egonets on the same peer and with higher availability. An overview
of the Prometheus service is presented in Section 2, and related work is covered in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 presents a detailed design of the service. We evaluated Prometheus over large-scale graph
simulations and with a large-scale deployment of a prototype on PlanetLab and tested its perfor-
mance with high-stress workloads from emulated applications. The results in Section 5 show that
the response time and system overhead for social inference execution is reduced when user social
data are distributed onto peers using a geo-socially-aware approach. We also implemented CallCen-
sor, a mobile social application that uses Prometheus to decide whether to filter out incoming calls
based on the current social context. As shown in Section 6, the response time for this application
running on a Google Android phone meets real-time deadlines, demonstrating that Prometheus’
overhead is practical for real applications. In addition, in Section 7 we study the system’s resilience
to malicious attacks and demonstrate that its socially-informed design and social graph structure
make the system more resilient to graph and inference request attacks. We conclude in Section 8.
2. OVERVIEW
In order to better understand the functionality of the Prometheus service, we present it as part of the
social hourglass infrastructure [Iamnitchi et al. 2012; Kourtellis 2012]. This infrastructure (illus-
trated in Figure 1(a)) consists of five main components: (1) social signals, (2) social sensors, (3) per-
sonal aggregators, (4) a social knowledge service (SKS), and (5) social applications. Social signals
are unprocessed user social information such as interaction logs (e.g., phone call history, emails,
etc.) or location and collocation information. Social sensors run on behalf of a user and parse the
user’s social signals, analyze them, and send processed social information to the personal aggregator
of the user. The user’s personal aggregator combines social information from the user’s sensors and
produces a personalized output based on user preferences. This personalized social information is
sent for storage and management to the SKS which maintains an augmented social graph that can be
mined by applications and services through an API that implements social inferences. Prometheus
fulfills the role of the SKS in the social hourglass infrastructure.
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Fig. 1: (a) Prometheus in the social hourglass infrastructure. (b) Prometheus peers are organized
using Pastry, a DHT-based overlay, Scribe, a DHT multicast infrastructure, and Past, a DHT storage
system. Scribe and Pastry are used for social graph and group maintenance. Users can trust selected
machines, allowed to decrypt and mine the user’s social subgraph to fulfill requests. Personal ag-
gregators store social input on Past and trusted peers retrieve and represent it as a directed, labeled,
weighted multi-graph. Applications mine the graph via Prometheus API social inferences, executed
between peers through direct P2P communication.
2.1. Input from Social Sensors & Aggregators
We refer to social signals as the information that exposes social interactions between people. Di-
verse social signals already exist as byproducts of Internet- or phone-mediated interactions, such
as email logs, comments on blogs or OSNs, instant messaging, ratings on user-generated content,
phone call logs, or via face-to-face interactions determined from (GPS or Bluetooth-reported) col-
location data. For example, a social signal could reflect the interactions of two users over a soccer
video posted on YouTube. These interactions reflect comments, “likes”, other video sharing, etc.
Social sensors analyze users’ social signals. Sensors are applications running on behalf of a user
on various platforms such as their mobile phone, PC, web browser, or trusted 3rd party services.
They transform the domain-specific interactions between their user-owner (ego) and others (alter)
into a message with the format: ego :<alter, label, weight>, where label specifies the interaction
domain (e.g., Facebook, Gaming, etc.) and weight associates a numeric value (e.g., in range
[0, 1]) to the interaction’s intensity, as in [Xiang et al. 2010]. Many such sensors already exist,
although they may not output social ties as they have been implemented in different contexts and for
different purposes. For example, such sensors record and quantify OSNs’ user activity [Lewis et al.
2008], co-appearance on web pages [Matsuo et al. 2006], or co-presence recorded as collocation via
Bluetooth [Eagle and Pentland 2006].
The personal aggregator is a trusted application typically running on a user-owned device (e.g.,
mobile phone) responsible for fusing and personalizing the information from the user’s social sig-
nals. It can perform sophisticated analysis on the input from the sensors, for example, to differ-
entiate between routine encounters with familiar strangers and interactions between friends [Eagle
and Pentland 2006]. It also applies user preferences for weighing signals differently: for example, a
Google Talk social signal may weigh less than Skype Chat in the aggregated value. In effect, the ag-
gregator transforms both the labels and weights received from sensors into a quantitative representa-
tion of ego and alter’s social interactions. Finally, it sends to the SKS a tuple for an aggregated inter-
action between ego and an alter, in the format:<ego, alter, general label, aggregated weight>.
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2.2. Prometheus as a Social Knowledge Service
The SKS provides a mechanism for storing and managing user social data and exposing them to ap-
plications and services. Prometheus, which fills-in the role of SKS in the social hourglass infrastruc-
ture, distributes the social information received from the aggregators on multiple user-contributed
peers for better service and data availability, while protecting access to data via encryption and
user-specified access policies. Prometheus design supports the following functionalities.
Persistent service for mining the social graph is achieved by employing a p2p architecture on
user-contributed resources without the availability constraints of architectures based on mobile
phones. In particular, our objective is to allow applications access to distant nodes in the social
graph, such as friends-of-friends queries.
Support to an unrestricted set of social applications and services is provided via two mechanisms:
an API that exports social inferences (such as social strength between indirectly-connected users)
and aggregated social information represented by social edge labels and weights. For the latter,
Prometheus maintains a weighted, directed, labeled, and multi-edged social graph, where vertices
correspond to users and labeled edges correspond to interactions between users, as reported by their
aggregators (see Figure 1(b) for an example of such a graph). Edge labels specify the type, and
weights specify the intensity of interaction. Edge directionality reflects the asymmetry of users’
perception of a social relationship [Wellman 1988] and allows for potentially conflicting reports
from the interacting users’ aggregators.
User-controlled data access is guaranteed via two mechanisms. First, data owners can specify
access control policies to limit access to their information. Second, all data are encrypted; however,
for mining the social graph information, some peers need to decrypt data in order to process it. Thus,
each user selects a group of trusted peers; only these peers can decrypt the user’s social data.
In addition, Prometheus deals with the typical challenges of churn-prone p2p systems by leverag-
ing well-established, previously proposed solutions in distributed hashtable overlays (DHTs). Fig-
ure 1(b) presents an overview of the architecture. Each peer runs three software components: 1) for
social graph management and application request execution; 2) for access control policy and key
management; and 3) for trusted peer group management.
2.3. Output to Applications and Services
Prometheus exposes an interface to a rich set of social inference requests computed over the dis-
tributed social graph. For example, an application can request on its user’s behalf to receive the top
n relations with whom the user interacts over Facebook. Similarly, it can request the social strength
between a user and another user not directly connected in the social graph. Prometheus provides the
mechanism with which inference requests can access not only a single user’s social neighborhood
(i.e., directly connected users), but also the social data of users located several hops away in the
global social graph. As mentioned before, all inferences are subject to user-defined access control
policies enforced by the trusted peers of the data owner.
2.4. Prometheus in Use: GamePartnerFinder Application
An application scenario is presented below for explaining how Prometheus is used in the context of
the social hourglass infrastructure. Let us assume that Tom is an active online gamer. However, due
to his type of work, he frequently travels around the world and his change of location does not allow
him to easily find game partners to play online: he is always on different timezone with respect to his
home buddies and also network delays can greatly hinder his gaming experience. To solve this issue,
he developed the GamePartnerF inder, an application which utilizes his geo-social information
stored on Prometheus to find for him partners to play with while on travel. The application takes
into account information such as: (1) his friends on Steam Community (SC) he frequently plays
with, (2) his friends on Facebook (FB) he interacts with, (3) his frequent phone / Google Chat
/ Skype contacts with respect to IM and calls, (4) his professional contacts on LinkedIn, (5) his
current location and friends he is collocated with (at a city / country / continent level).
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At installation, the application checks with Tom’s aggregator which of the required and optional
social sensors he is currently registered with. These sensors report Tom’s activity to Prometheus,
subject to a personalized filter stored and applied by his aggregator (as mentioned earlier). This filter
is updated rarely—when there are significant changes in activity patterns or new social sensors are
deployed—or can be left to a default setting that weighs all signals equally. GamePartnerF inder
will mine Prometheus’ aggregated information on Tom in order to decide which contacts to present
as possible game partners for his next session at his current location.
To compile this list, GamePartnerF inder will first query Prometheus for a list of Tom’s so-
cial contacts that are also geographically close to him. This allows the application to infer which
contacts would be good candidates with respect to network delays and timezone (e.g. same geo-
graphical region). Further, the application will query Prometheus for the type of connection and
social distance between each returned contact and Tom. Contacts classified as “friends of friends”
(i.e., 2-hop neighbors) could be included in the list, depending on user-specified application-related
preferences. For instance, Tom could specify that 1-hop SC or FB friends can be included, as well
as 2-hop SC friends connected over high activity weights, but not 2-hop FB friends who are not
already in the previous categories. LinkedIn contacts could be filtered out. The multi-hop request
allows the application to infer a diverse list of online contacts, close to Tom with respect to network
delays, with similar game expertise, and have the social incentives to accept a game invitation from
Tom.
Non time-critical applications such as the GamePartnerF inder could wait for some time
(e.g., minutes) before producing a good list of game partner candidates, especially if this search
involves multi-hop inferences and network delay measurements. However, more time-critical ap-
plications such as a context-aware phone-call filtering application (e.g., the CallCensor [Kourtellis
et al. 2010b,a] and Section 6) could have a lower tolerance on waiting time. To facilitate both types
of applications, we extended the Prometheus API from past work to support not only the above
geo-social requests, but also allow applications to define a timeout parameter which limits the ap-
plication waiting time. Thus, if Bob installed CallCensor, his incoming personal calls could be
automatically silenced during professional meetings, but co-workers’ or other professional-related
calls could be let through, and this filtering decision should be made within a very short time period
(e.g., a few seconds) before the call is dropped or goes to voicemail.
3. RELATED WORK
Decentralized management of social data using peer-to-peer architecture has been proposed in other
studies such as PeerSoN [Buchegger et al. 2009], Vis-a`-Vis [Shakimov et al. 2009], Safebook [Cu-
tillo et al. 2010], LifeSocial.KOM [Graffi et al. 2011] and LotusNet [Aiello and G.Ruffo 2012].
PeerSoN [Buchegger et al. 2009] is a two-tier system architecture: the first tier is used to lookup
(through a DHT) for metadata of users, current location/IP, notifications, etc.; the second tier allows
opportunistic and delay-tolerant networking and is used for the actual contact between peers and
users and the exchange of data (files, profiles, chat, etc.). Users can exchange data either through
a DHT storage or directly between their devices. Vis-a`-Vis [Shakimov et al. 2009] introduces the
concept of a Virtual Individual Server (VIS) where each user’s data are stored on a personal virtual
machine. While similar to the trusted peer concept in Prometheus, VISs are hosted by a centralized
cloud computing provider to tackle peer churn, whereas Prometheus provides a truly decentralized,
free of cost infrastructure and uses social incentives to reduce churn of user-contributed peers.
Safebook [Cutillo et al. 2010] is a decentralized OSN with a 3-component architecture: a trusted
identification service to provide each peer and user unambiguous identifiers, a P2P substrate for
lookup of data, and “matryoshkas”, concentric rings of peers around each member’s peer that pro-
vide trusted data storage, profile data retrieval and obscure communication through indirection.
Similarly, Prometheus users employ multiple trusted peers and forwards messages between peers
based on social relations and inference requests, while restricting a large scale view of the graph
through P2P decentralization. Prometheus differs, however, in the exposure of the graph as a first
class data object through inference functionality.
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LotusNet [Aiello and G.Ruffo 2012] is a DHT-based OSN that binds user identities with their
overlay nodes and published resources for increased security. Users control access to their data
by issuing signed grants to other users applied during retrieval of data. Services such as event no-
tification, folksonomic content search and reputation management are demonstrated. In LifeSo-
cial.KOM [Graffi et al. 2011], user information is stored in the form of distributed linked lists in a
DHT and is accessible from various plugin-based applications, while enforcing symmetric PKI to
ensure user-controlled privacy and access. User data are isolated from one another, and peers access
them individually. Commercial efforts such as Enthinnai,3 FreedomBox,4 and Diaspora5 implement
distributed social networking services allowing users to share content in a decentralized fashion.
Our work differs from the previously noted academic and commercial approaches in the follow-
ing ways. First, it not only collects and stores user social information from multiple sources in a P2P
network, but also exposes social inference functions to socially-aware applications that mine the so-
cial information stored. Second, it addresses the space between centralized and fully decentralized
systems, as it allows multiple users to store social information on common peers they trust. These
peers can locally mine the collection of social data entrusted to them by the groups of (possibly
socially-connected) users, thus improving social data access and quality of inferences to applica-
tions. Third, Prometheus enables users to select trusted peers independent from the users’ (mobile)
devices to decrypt and mine their social data at any time, thus increasing service availability.
4. DESIGN
Prometheus manages a labeled, weighted social multigraph distributed on a collection of user-
contributed peers. Unlike other p2p solutions, Prometheus does not require each user to contribute a
peer. Instead, it leverages social incentives to allow a user’s data be managed by the peer contributed
by a trusted social relation. This approach embeds social awareness in the service design and has
three immediate benefits. First, it improves scalability since the system size can be much smaller
than the number of its users. Second, socially-incentivized users keep their computers online, thus
reducing churn [Li and Dabek 2006; Nguyen et al. 2008] and consequently increasing service avail-
ability. And finally, because socially-related users are likely to select the same trusted peers for their
data management, the resulting data collocation decreases remote access for social graph traversals.
A less intuitive benefit from the social-based mapping of the social graph onto the p2p network in-
cludes a reduced vulnerability to malicious attacks in comparison to random-based mappings such
as pure DHT-based systems, as demonstrated in Section 7.
Prometheus uses a public-key infrastructure (PKI) to ensure both message confidentiality and user
/ peer authentication. Using their personal trusted device (e.g., mobile phone or laptop), users create
public and private keys for both themselves (P , p) and their trusted peer group (G, g) decrypting
their social data. The group public key (G) can be placed on the DHT for other peers to access for
decryption of incoming messages. Peers trusted by a user must have his group keys as well as his
personal public key (P ). All messages contain nonces added by the senders. They are reattached in
the replies by the receivers to acknowledge correct delivery and execution, and in combination with
timestamps, they dissallow replay attacks. After these appendices, the messages are digitally signed
with the sender’s private key to preserve integrity and confirm authenticity, and then encrypted
with the receiver’s public key to protect the message from unauthorized receivers. The Prometheus
social data consist of labeled and weighted social edges as reported by personal aggregators. They
are signed, encrypted and stored in Past [Rowstron and Druschel 2001b], a DHT-based storage built
on top of the Pastry overlay [Rowstron and Druschel 2001a]. Only trusted peers are capable of
decrypting their user’s data for graph processing.
3http://www.enthinnai.com/
4http://freedomboxfoundation.org/
5https://joindiaspora.com/
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4.1. User Registration
A user registers with Prometheus by creating a uniform random UID from the circular 128-bit ID
space of the DHT (typically the hash of their public key). At registration time, the user specifies
her peer(s) contributed to the network (if any). The user then creates a mapping between her UID
and the list of these peers’ IP addresses, signs it with her private key and stores this mapping in
the DHT network as the key-value pair UID = {IP1, ..., IPn}. When one of these peers returns
from an offline state, it updates the mapping with its current IP address. The user also compiles a
list of other Prometheus users with whom she shares strong out-of-band trust relations (and has ex-
changed public keys) and retrieves from Past their machine mappings. She confirms the mappings’
authenticity and from the returned list of peers, she selects an initial set as her trusted peer group.
The larger this set, the higher the service availability; at the same time, the consistency and overall
performance may decrease. The trusted peer group may change over time, as shown next.
4.2. Trusted Peer Group Management
The main issues concerning the trusted peer group management are group membership and search
for trusted peers. For managing the trusted peer group we leverage Scribe [Castro et al. 2002], a
group communication solution designed for DHTs.
In general, communication between trusted peers for group management happens over
the DHT/Scribe’s multicast protocol by appending the message to be sent with the
groupid, signing with the group private key and encrypting with the group public key:
{{msg, nonce, groupid, timestamp}g}G. The receiving trusted peers decrypt the message with
the group private key, verify the signature of the sender peer as trusted using the group public key
and read/execute the message.
The group management happens as follows. Let us consider that Alice uses her personal device
as a proxy to add peers to her trusted peer group, initialized as a Scribe group with the handle
“Trusted Peer Group UID”, where UID is Alice’s user id. For this, she initiates a secure three-step
handshake procedure to establish a two-way trust relationship between her and Bob, a peer owner.
The following steps take place in the direct peer communication layer (Figure 1(b)): (1) Through
out-of-band methods, she has invited Bob and he has accepted to participate in her trusted peer group
by sharing his public key (as mentioned earlier). (2) Alice sends Bob the keys of her trusted peer
group (enhanced with a nonce, timestamp, Bob’s userid, and then signed with her private key and
encrypted with Bob’s public key). (3) By decrypting the message with his private key and verifying
its authenticity with Alice’s public key, Bob installs on his peer the received group keys, enabling his
peer to join Alice’s group by sending a digitally signed and encrypted subscribe request to Alice’s
Scribe trusted group:{{subscribe, nonce, groupid, timestamp}g}G. Receiving these keys allows
the newly trusted peer to access the user’s social data as explained later. Note that a malicious peer
owner cannot force anyone to give him their data if they don’t trust him first.
For removing a trusted peer, Alice will have to create new group keys, re-encrypt her signed data
with the new group public key, and store them in the DHT. The removal of the peer from a user’s
trusted group is multicasted to all group peers and the peer is unsubscribed from the group. The
new group keys are distributed to the still trusted peers as before. The distribution of new keys and
re-encryption of the social data disallows the removed peer from decrypting updated versions of
the user’s data. If a peer owner decides to remove her peer from another user’s trusted group (e.g,
due to overload), the removal request is multicasted to the group, which in turn executes the above
procedure and alerts the data owner of the change.
A requesting peer or application can find a user’s trusted peers by submitting a multicast TPL
request with handle Trusted Peer Group UID. With the multicast, all online group trusted peers re-
spond with their IP and signed membership, which is verified for authenticity with the user’s group
public key. The requesting peer creates a trusted peer list (TPL) of IPs based on peer responses. The
multicast allows the requesting peer to have peer alternatives in case of churn or erroneous com-
munication with the first responding peer. The search for trusted peers follows the Scribe multicast
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Fig. 2: An example of a social graph for eight users (a-h) distributed on seven peers. The left figure
shows the mapping between users, peer owners, and trusted peers (upper left corner) and how users
are connected with each other over social edges, each marked with its label and weight. The right
figures illustrate the subgraphs maintained by peers 1 and 5. Users in dark color (e.g., a, b, c on peer
1) trust the peer to manage their social data. Users in light-shaded color (e.g., e, d on peer 1) do not
trust the peer but are socially connected with users who do.
tree which utilizes the Pastry DHT routing and its network proximity metric to forward messages to
near-by peers, thus reducing overall delays. In effect, the responds from trusted peers are sorted in
the TPL by overall latency. The peer, upon creating the TPL for a user’s group, can communicate
directly with the individual trusted peers, preferably the one responding fastest. Prometheus caches
the TPL after the first access and updates it when the trusted peers are unresponsive, changed their
IP, or became untrusted. Users can also apply their own TPL update policies based on their usage
patterns. A user’s social data are unavailable if all her trusted peers leave the network; no service
requests involving this user can be answered until a trusted peer rejoins the network. However, we
ensure durability of users’ generated data (i.e., input from social aggregators) via encrypted storage
and replication in the DHT by Past.
4.3. Distributed Social Graph
Prometheus represents the social graph as a directed, labeled, and weighted multi-edged graph [An-
derson et al. 2010], maintained and used in a decentralized fashion as presented in Figure 2.
Multiple edges can connect two users, and each edge is labeled with a type of social interaction
and assigned a weight (a real number in the range [0, 1]) representing the interaction’s intensity. The
labels for interactions and their associated weights are assigned by the personal aggregator of each
user. From an application point of view, distinguishing between different types of interactions allows
for better functionality. For extensibility, we designed Prometheus to be oblivious to the number
and types of social activities reported by the aggregators. Furthermore, we chose to represent the
graph as directed and weighted because social ties are asymmetrically reciprocal [Wellman 1988].
This representation also limits illegitimate graph uses (e.g., for spamming). A user’s latest known
location and an associated timestamp are maintained as an attribute of the user’s vertex in the graph.
Social data (sd) of a user are appended with a nonce, his group’s id and a timestamp,
then signed with the user’s private key and then encrypted with the user’s group public key:
{{sd, nonce, groupid, timestamp}p}G. This encrypted item is stored in Past in the append-only
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file Social Data UID. Only the user’s personal aggregator can send updates to create new edges,
remove edges, or modify edge weights. These updates are appended in this file as records with a
sequence number. Trusted peers periodically check the file for new records and retrieve all such
records: this is easily done based on sequence number comparison starting from the end of the file.
They decrypt new records with the user’s group private key (g) and verify the data’s authenticity
with the user’s personal public key (P). By checking the nonce, they confirm they haven’t received
this item before and incorporate the changes with the rest of the local graph. As the social data file
is append-only, the trusted peers can access it at any time: in the worst case, they will miss the latest
update. Therefore, for short periods of time, the trusted peers may have inconsistent data, but this is
not a major problem as social graphs do not change often [Golbeck 2007].
Edges may “decay” over time if few (or no) activity updates are received [Roberts and Dunbar
2010]. This aging process should be activity specific, but it should also reflect the user’s social habits
and interests: users who are less socially active and users with a great number of friends should have
their relationships age slower. Currently, the system applies a simple aging function to reduce an
edge’s weight by 10% for every week the two users do not interact over the particular label (thus,
the connection never completely disappears and the aging happens slowly). A user’s aggregator may
specify a different decrement value of the weight and the time period for aging (these values are also
stored in the Social Data UID file for each user).
4.4. Social Inference API
Prometheus exposes to applications an API of social inference functions that are executed in a
decentralized fashion; more complex inferences can be built on top of this set.
Relation Test(ego, alter, α, χ) is a boolean function that checks whether ego is directly con-
nected to alter by an edge with label α and with a minimum weight χ. The CallCensor appli-
cation [Kourtellis et al. 2010b,a] can use this function to determine if an incoming call is from a
coworker with a strong social tie, and therefore, should be let through even on weekends.
Top Relations(ego, α, n) returns the top n users directly connected to ego by an edge with label
α, and ordered by decreasing weights. An application can use this function, for example, to invite
users highly connected with ego to share content related to activity α.
Our previous study [Kourtellis et al. 2010b] revealed volatility of the peer-to-peer communication
and long response delays during multi-hop inference execution. Thus, we redesigned the following
API functions to offer better quality of service to applications, by allowing them to define a timeout
parameter T , which limits the application waiting time.
Neighborhood(ego, α, χ, radius, T) returns the set of users in ego’s social neighborhood who are
connected through social ties of label α and minimum weight χwithin a number of social hops equal
to radius. The radius parameter allows for a multi-hop search in the social graph (e.g., setting radius
to 2 will find ego’s friends of friends). The GamePartnerFinder application can use this function to
determine if a user is in ego’s “gaming” graph neighborhood even if not directly connected.
Proximity(ego, α, χ, radius, distance, timestamp, T) is an extension of the neighborhood function
which filters its results based on physical distance to ego. After ego’s location information is col-
lected, and neighborhood returns a set of users, proximity returns the set of users within distance
from ego and their location information is at most as old as timestamp. Users who do not share
their location or have location information older than the timestamp are not returned. A mobile
phone application like CallCensor might use this function to infer the collocated coworkers within
distance from ego.
Social Strength(ego, alter, T) returns a real number in the range [0, 1] that quantifies the social
strength between ego and alter from ego’s perspective. Past studies in sociology [Friedkin 1983]
observed that two individuals have meaningful social relationships when connected within two so-
cial hops (i.e., “horizon of observability”), and their relationship strength greatly depends on the
number of different direct or indirect paths connecting them. Therefore, the two users in this func-
tion can be directly or indirectly connected and through multiple parallel paths (e.g., paths c→b→e
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and c→d→e between c and e, Figure 2). The returned value is normalized, as explained below, to
ego’s social ties, to ensure that the social strength is less sensitive to a particular user activity.
Assume Λi,j is the set of labels of edges for two directly connected users i and j, w(i, j, λ) is the
weight of an edge between i and j over label λ, and Θi the set of directly connected neighbors to
i. Then, nw(i, j) (eq.1) is the overall normalized weight between i and j. Also, assume users i and
m are indirectly connected over different 2-hop paths. Then, S(i,m) (eq.2) is the value returned
for social strength between i and m, over a multi-level 2-hop path. This function could be used, for
example, to assess social incentives for resource or data sharing.
nw(i, j) =
∑
∀λ∈Λi,j
w(i, j, λ)
max
∀j∈Θi
( ∑
∀λ∈Λi,j
w(i, j, λ)
) (1), S(i,m) = 1− ∏
∀j∈Θi∩Θm
(
1− min{nw(i, j), nw(j,m)}
2
)
(2)
Inference Function Execution: Assume user x wants to submit (through an application) a so-
cial inference request to one of her trusted peers. Using the process explained in Section 4.2,
the application creates x’s TPL and forwards the request to x’s fastest responding and thus
network-closest (shortest latency) trusted peer. This is done through the direct communication
layer in a secure fashion by appending on the request a nonce, x’s userid and a timestamp,
then signing the message with x’s private key and encrypting it with x’s group public key:
{{request, userid, nonce, timestamp}p}G. The receiving peer decrypts the message with x’s
group private key (g), verifies the submitter’s identity via her public key and if the query has not
been seen before (by checking the nonce) and the peer is indeed trusted by x, the peer enforces
x’s access control policies (described next). In all other cases, the request is dropped. Then the
peer fulfills the request by (1) traversing the local social subgraph for the requested information,
(2) signing and encrypting the result using the requesting user’s public key and the group’s private
key, respectively, and (3) returning it to the user (application).
For functions that can traverse the graph for n hops (i.e., Neighborhood, Proximity and So-
cial Strength), the peer submits signed and encrypted secondary requests for information about
other users to their trusted peers, as follows. A secondary request includes the UID of the original
submitter in order to verify her access rights, then it is signed with her group private key and en-
crypted with the receiving user group’s public key. A time period of T ∗ (n − 1) seconds is given
to the secondary peers to respond with their results (peers at each hop use independent clocks for
T seconds). Each receiving secondary peer decrypts the request with the group private key, authen-
ticates the signature with the requesting group’s public key and checks the access control policies
for the requesting user. If the request is granted, the result is returned to the requesting peer. If the
request still needs more information, that peer (e.g., at hop k) repeats the same process and submits
a secondary request with an adjusted T ∗ (n− k − 1) timeout. Finally, the original requesting peer
recursively collects all the replies and submits the final result to the application.
4.5. Access Control Policies
Users can specify access control policies (ACPs) upon registration and update them any time there-
after. These policies, stored on each of the user’s trusted peers, are applied each time an inference
request is submitted to one of these peers to access social information for the particular user. For
availability, the policies are signed, encrypted and stored in the DHT, allowing only a rejoining
trusted peer to recover updated policies (similarly with the social data).
ACPs are comprised of two parts: the social data object(s) to be accessed and the specification(s)
to be met before access is granted for the particular data object(s). They are defined as entries of
the ACP UID file in the following format: <Social Data Object(s)> :: <ACP Specification(s)>.
Table I presents a list of such access control policy definitions. By design, ACPs are whitelists. Any
of the specifications can be used to allow access to any of the data objects. Each of the data objects,
as well as each of the specifications, can be combined with logical operators (e.g., AND, OR, NOT,
etc.), to create more complex access policies. To verify the access rights, Prometheus may call its
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inference functions, when applicable. For example, to detect whether the request’s originating user
is within n-hops, she is checked against the result of an n-hop neighborhood inference. ACPs also
allow for blacklisted users (and their peers) for convenience. Given that it may take some time to
discover malicious users or peers and update blacklists across the system, some attacks could take
place. As future work, we plan to investigate the effective discovery and blacklisting of malicious
peers, as well as the provision of strong consistency and conflict resolution for policies.
Table I also shows an example of the set of access control policies for Bob. He allows work-
related social information to be given to requests coming from users within 2 hops who are con-
nected with him over LinkedIn label, or when these requests come from the CallCensor application.
Also, he allows his parents and his brother to access his exact location at any time. If a neighbor-
hood inference request for the Facebook label is submitted toBob’s trusted peer, Prometheus checks
his ACP in the order Blacklist→labels→weights. Alice and Gary are excluded from all types of
inferences and cannot receive any information about Bob.
To protect their data from illegitimate access, users can set strict ACPs, for example, serving only
requests originating from trusted 1-hop friends. Such ACPs will disallow 2-hop contacts from ac-
cessing any data, but will also restrict the usability of multi-hop inferences such as social strength
or neighborhood. Overall, we anticipate a tradeoff between how ACPs are defined to protect social
data, and the usability of the platform through social inferences on these data. However, as demon-
strated in the ACPs definition, users can fine-tune them to allow different access rights to particular
sets of users, enabling inferences, and in extend applications, to maintain their functionality by
accessing specific portions of user data.
Table I: Access Control Policy Definitions and Examples.
Social Data Objects ACP Specifications ACP Examples
Social edge label α Social distance ρ
Social edge weight χ Social edge label γ < χ = 0.3 >::< ρ = 1 AND S = SofaSurfer > OR C = Charles) >
User location ∆ Social edge weight y < ∆ >::< B = mom ORB = dad ORB = brother >
Originator user B < α = Skype >::< ρ = 2 AND γ = Skype AND y = 0.2 >
Originator peer P < α = Facebook AND χ = 0.2 >::< ρ = 1 AND γ = Facebook >
Intermediate user C < α = LinkedIn >::< (ρ = 2 AND γ = LinkedIn)
Intermediate peer M OR S = CallCensor >
Application S < blacklist >::< B = Alice ORB = Gary >
Originator’s location L
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate our system design, we used both simulations (Section 5.1) and experiments with a real
implementation deployed on PlanetLab (Section 5.2).
5.1. Simulation Experiments
We measured system performance, scalability and benefits from caching and geographic distribution
of data on peers with three sets of experiments. In these tests, we simulated the inference function-
alities of Prometheus while varying the size of stored social graphs, the type of data mapping on
peers, the distribution of network delays, and data caching.
5.1.1. Experimental Setup. The two metrics used in this evaluation were expected response time
to quantify the application-perceived performance, and number of P2P network messages to quan-
tify the service overhead. We used synthetic bidirectional social graphs created with a genera-
tor [Sala et al. 2010] which consistently produces graphs with properties such as degree distribution
and clustering coefficient similar to real social graphs, but independent of the particularities of spe-
cific real graphs (Table II). Edge weights were equally set to 0.1. We assumed open ACPs for all
users, allowing access to all data from all users, thus stressing the system at maximum load. We
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chose a random workload of 10% of graph users requesting data within 1–3 hops, to investigate the
system performance equally across all types of users (periphery and popular users alike).
We examined a random and a social-based mapping of user data on peers. The social mapping
corresponds to a realistic scenario where a group of socially-connected users share the resources of a
peer contributed by a group member. For this mapping, the synthetic graphs were split into commu-
nities using the Louvain community detection method [Blondel et al. 2008], then each community
was mapped on a peer and we applied no data replication. Depending on the size of the graph used,
the number of peers in the system varied between 1.5 and 166 thousand peers, with 6–8 users/peer,
on average. In the random mapping, user data are randomly grouped into sets of the same sizes as
in the social mapping, and mapped on peers.
We experimented with three network delay distributions for peer messages, simulating different
geographical distributions of data. Using a PL-delay trace6 between 242 PL servers located in
21 countries, we extracted distribution delays for random peers, for peers within the same country,
and for peers within the same continent. Thus, at the m-th network hop of an n-hop request, peers
sent requests to other peers with a delay randomly selected from the delay distribution tested. The
maximum delay for the m-th hop is used as its dominating network delay. The expected response
time of a request is the sum of these maximum delays across all hops.
We evaluated the benefits of data caching by storing the results seen from each peer and skipping
unnecessary secondary requests the local cache could fulfill. Every t seconds the cache expired,
depending on how frequently edges changed as observed on each peer from incoming social inputs.
For simplicity, we assumed caches were always valid, i.e., an inter-arrival time of requests smaller
than the cache expiration period. We validated our simulator using k-regular synthetic networks7
with similar properties as the synthetic social networks (same degree k and number of vertices) and
confirmed that the results returned (i.e., messages sent/received) match the analytical calculations (in
the order of O(2k(m−1)) for the m-th hop). We executed each setup 10 times and report statistically
significant average values.
Table II: Description of synthetic graphs used. AD: average degree, CC: clustering coefficient, ED:
effective diameter, C: Number of communities, ACS: Average community size.
Dataset Nodes Edges AD CC ED C ACS
1k 1000 5895 11.8 0.263 5.47 132 7.58
10k 10 000 58 539 11.7 0.219 6.56 1562 6.40
100k 100 000 587 970 11.8 0.207 7.07 15 692 6.37
1000k 1 000 000 5 896 878 11.8 0.204 7.76 166 314 6.01
5.1.2. Scalability and Caching. Figure 3(a) shows the average number of messages sent between
peers over different size graphs, with a detailed CDF for the graph of 1 million users in Fig. 3(d)
(similar distributions were observed for the other graph sizes and are omitted for brevity). As ex-
pected, increasing the graph size forces the system to exchange more P2P messages. The increase
is small for 2-hop requests (5-10%) and larger in 3-hop requests (23-40%) in random mapping, and
(25-30%) in social mapping. The social mapping needs fewer messages: about 50% of random in
2-hop (across all graph sizes) and 40-65% of random in 3-hop requests. When caching is enabled,
the 2-hop requests do not benefit since secondary requests sent to other peers start from users con-
necting different communities, and we never repeat requests from the same users. Instead, 3-hop
requests significantly benefit: when the graph size increases, the increase in messages is reduced to
1-2% (from 20-40%) in both mappings. However, the social mapping still produces about 44-48%
fewer messages than random, with the difference increasing with graph size. Figure 3(e) shows the
effect of caching in subsequent requests: with 50% of requests executed (i.e., 50k requests in the
1M -user graph), the number of P2P messages drops by an order of magnitude.
6http://ridge.cs.umn.edu/pltraces.html
7The SNAP library was used (http://snap.stanford.edu/snap/index.html) with rewiring probability p = 0.1.
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Fig. 3: Simulation results over various settings: Social (S) or Random (R) mappings; 2 (2H) or
3-hop (3H) requests; caching (C) or no-caching (NC); random, continent or country delays (RD,
COD, CND). (a) Average P2P messages vs. graph sizes (y-bars show 95% confidence intervals). (b)
Median network times vs. geo-distribution of peers (1M users) (y-bars show 1st and 3rd quartiles).
(c) CDF of expected network time with no caching (1M users). (d) CDF of total P2P messages (1M
users). (e) Average P2P messages vs. portion of 3-hop requests served (1M users).
5.1.3. Geo-distribution of peers. Figure 3(b) shows the median end-to-end response time needed
for a 3-hop request to be fulfilled, given different geographical distributions of peers (random, in-
continent or in-country). Also, Figure 3(c) shows the CDF of the time for 2 or 3-hop requests in the
social mapping for the 1M-user graph. Considering median cases in the random delays (Fig 3(b)),
requests in the social mapping are fulfilled 30-40% faster that in random for 3-hops (and 16-20%
faster for 2-hops, not shown here). If socially-mapped peers send secondary requests to other peers
within the same continent(country), the network times are 50% (70%) smaller than random delays
for 2-hops, and about 38% (45%) for 3-hops (Fig 3(c)). When caching is enabled (Fig 3(b)), the
social mapping with continent (country) delays reduces response times to 50% (67%) of the random
delays in the 3 hops.
5.2. PlanetLab Experiments
We implemented Prometheus on top of the FreePastry8 Java implementation of Pastry DHT which
also provides API support for Scribe and Past. We performed various optimizations and fine tuning
from our earlier work [Kourtellis et al. 2010b] to better handle the communication volatility and
peer churn typically observed in a distributed infrastructure. We also redesigned the API to allow
applications to submit a serializable class-based request by defining within the class object not only
inference-specific parameters (such as label and weight) but also the new timeout parameter, which
declares the application waiting time per hop when requesting multi-hop inferences. Furthermore,
applications and peers can define parameters such as request id, timestamp and error flags. Overall,
the new API design enhanced extensibility for future inference parameters, portability across dif-
ferent platforms, and improved the peer-to-peer and peer-to-application communication during in-
ference execution. We measured Prometheus’ performance on PlanetLab (PL), a widely distributed
network, and assessed the effect of socially-aware trusted peer selection on the system’s overall
performance.
8http://www.freepastry.org/
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5.2.1. Experimental Setup. In these experiments we deployed the prototype on 100 selected PL
peers worldwide (35 countries). We set the application timeout to 15 seconds/hop in the first set
of experiments and tested lower timeouts in the second set. This timeout is needed to deal with
communication delays due to long RTTs (125ms on average), busy network interfaces (the PL
peers are shared resources), uncontrolled peer churn, and forwarding of requests. Prometheus uses
this parameter to decide when to aggregate the intermediate results received so far and send them
to the requesting peer. We note that the overall response time measured was dominated by the PL
network delays (order of seconds) in comparison to the overhead for different local activities such
as request parsing, decryption and signature verification and subgraph traversal on each peer (order
of milliseconds); thus we focus
We did not control the churn; peers were subjected to an average PL churn of ∼5%. To remove
any bias from the data placement on faster or slower responding or failing peers, and the submission
of requests from or to such peers, we distributed sets of data on randomly selected peers (thus
enforcing random delays between peers) and each peer submitted application workload on behalf
of all users. Edge weights were initially set to 0.1 and dynamically updated over time based on
an empirically driven model explained in Section 5.2.3. In addition to the two metrics reported in
simulations, we also measured the percentage of completion to quantify the tradeoff between request
response time and level of request completion.
The overloaded testbed led to increased communication delays while creating trusted peer lists.
For a request for user x to be sent, an application has to first create x’s TPL—an operation which
involves several time-consuming DHT lookups, resulting in multiple peer traversals—and then for-
ward the request to the first responding trusted peer. The distribution of the overhead associated
with the cold start of creating a user’s TPL over PL had a 50th, 90th and 99th percentile of 1.05,
2.15 and 8.78 seconds, respectively. Thus, for the majority of users this process can be fast, but for
some users it can take as much as 8–10 seconds (similar delays of 6–10 seconds were reported for
the Vis-a-Vis’ group activities [Shakimov et al. 2009] running on PL). To mitigate this problem,
Prometheus caches the TPL as explained in Section 4.2. As we are interested not in testing the
DHT but Prometheus’ performance in inference execution, our results show the performance using
this caching mechanism and the direct peer communication layer (as discussed in Figure 1(b)).
5.2.2. Graph Decentralization. We used the 1k-user graph to reflect a realistic scenario of dis-
tributing a social graph on 100 friend-contributed peers: each contributing user is trusted by a low
number of relations. We vary this number from 10 to 50 (allowing replication), although one peer
can handle requests for 1000 users with no performance penalty [Anderson 2010]. The scale of the
graph and consequently of the P2P network tested is sufficient for evaluation of meaningful social
inferences typically traversing a social neighborhood of 2-3 hops. 1000 users mapped on 100 peers
provided enough variation for statistically significant measurements on a real deployment.
We distributed the graph on PL peers using a random (as before) and a social mapping. The
average number of users/peer received values N=10, 30 and 50 users/peer. The number of PL peers
was kept constant to 100, forcing the user groups to overlap for N>10. This resembles the realistic
scenario of overlapping social circles with some users participating in more than one circle (peer),
and thus having multiple trusted peers. In effect, user data were replicated on K=N /10 peers on
average, hence K=1, 3 and 5 trusted peers/user.
To produce overlapping communities in the social mapping in a controlled fashion leading to
the specific replication factors, we modified the community detection algorithm from [Girvan and
Newman 2002] to control the number of communities and their average size. The algorithm takes as
input the graph, the number of communities to be identified and the minimum acceptable community
size. Then, it iteratively removes the highest betweenness centrality edge, if by removing it a new
community of the desired size is created. Removal of edges continues until the specified number
of communities is met. Users from a community are then mapped on the same peer. However, as
previously mentioned, neighboring communities in the social graph were mapped on random peers
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worldwide. This setup forced both geographically-close and socially-connected communities to be
stored on random peers across the globe, enabling us to examine worse case random network delays.
5.2.3. Synthetic Workloads. We emulated the workload of a social sensor and two social applica-
tions based on previous system characterizations. The sensor tested the platform’s ability to manage
and incorporate new social input under high-stress load. The user applications tested the end-to-end
performance of the neighborhood and social strength requests.
Edge weight update: We emulated a Facebook social sensor using the probability for users to post
comments on walls and photos extracted from [Wilson et al. 2009]. To emulate an interaction from
ego to alter, a random egowas selected based on their degree, and a random alter from ego’s 1-hop
friends. The weight of each input was kept constant to 0.01 for all users. Since users were picked
based on their degree, users with higher degree probabilistically produced more input, leading to
higher weights on their corresponding edges.
Workload for Neighborhood Inference: A neighborhood request is a limited-distance flood in the
network, similar to a tweet in Twitter. We used a Twitter trace analysis [Krishnamurthy et al. 2008]
to associate a tweet with a neighborhood request (centered at the source of the tweet) in Prometheus.
Users submitted neighborhood requests probabilistically based on their Twitter degree. The number
of hops for the request was randomly picked from 1–3 hops and the weight was randomly picked,
with an upper bound of 0.1 to produce maximum request load in the system.
Workload for Social Strength Inference: We used an analysis of BitTorrent traces to emulate the
workload of a battery-aware BitTorrent application [King et al. 2009] on mobile devices: a user may
rely on social incentives to be allowed to temporarily “free ride” the system when low on battery.
Members of the same swarm check their social strength with the needy leecher to see if they want to
contribute by uploading on her behalf. We assumed that users participated at random in BitTorrent
swarms. Two users were randomly selected as the source and destination of the social strength
inference request. The source user was associated with a total number of requests she would submit
in the experiment. This number was extracted from a BitTorrent trace analysis [Guo et al. 2005].
5.2.4. End-to-end performance on PlanetLab. For every setup, more than 1 million so-
cial strength and neighborhood requests and more than 100 thousand edge updates were submitted
from the emulated applications and social sensors running on the PL peers. Figures 4(a)–(c) show
the CDF of end-to-end average response time for the neighborhood inferences and the different
setups. Since the social strength inference checks all possible 2-hop paths between two users, its
results are almost identical to 2-hop neighborhood inferences and are omitted for brevity.
As expected, the measured response time was higher than the simulations due to overloaded
testbed: high average RTT (125ms), overloaded CPUs and network interfaces cards (it took 1-2 sec-
onds just to establish a reliable TCP connection for the direct peer communications). Furthermore,
the response time greatly depended on the hops requested. Larger hops lead to more peers contacted
per hop (e.g., for a 3-hop request, and for 10 users/peer in social (random) mapping, ∼37(48) peers
were contacted and ∼350 users returned). Thus, though the result aggregation is executed in paral-
lel per hop, multiple peers must be contacted, which leads to dependency on a few slow-responding
peers. We observe this in the flat regions of the CDFs, where ∼10 of 15secs timeout were spent
waiting. However, an application can reduce the timeout to receive earlier some (incomplete) re-
sults (shown next).
5.2.5. Response Time vs. Completion Rate. The previous experiments confirmed that a longer
timeout (e.g., T=15seconds per hop) offers a high completion rate, even though the majority of
this timeout (∼2/3) could be spent waiting for just a few slow peers to respond. We designed a
second set of experiments to measure the tradeoff between response time and response completion
rate. We varied the timeout T to 2.5, 5.0, 7.5, 10.0 seconds and used the social mapping with 30
users/peer. Figure 4(d) shows the CDF of the average completion percentage of the 3-hop neigh-
borhood requests under different application-set timeouts. The results for 1 and 2 hops showed very
high completion for all requests and timeouts and are omitted for brevity. Overall, we observe a clear
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Fig. 4: PlanetLab experiments on the 1k-user graph. (a)–(c) CDF of average end-to-end response
time of 1-3 hop neighborhood requests for social (S) vs. random (R) mapping of users on peers, and
10-50 users/peer. (d) CDF of average completion percentage of 3–hop neighborhood requests for
varying timeouts.
tradeoff between request completion rate and application waiting time for response. For example,
when T=7.5(10)seconds, about 50%(80%) of requests have more than 90% completion. Thus, the
longer an application is willing to wait, the more complete the information returned by the social
inference is. A real-time social application—e.g., “using the proximity inference, invite my 2-hop
football contacts for celebration of the team’s victory”—could set a low timeout for quick, yet in-
complete, results vs. the GamePartnerFinder application that can wait more time to get complete
results.
5.3. Summary of lessons
From the above simulation and PlanetLab experimental results we draw the following lessons on
Prometheus’ performance.
Lesson 1: The social-based mapping of user data on peers improved the response times by 20-
25% and reduced the message overhead by 40–65% in comparison to random. Such gains are
observed in the cases of 10-30 users/peer (less for 50 users/peer), and for 2-3 hops; the 1-hop is
computed either locally at the submitting peer or the first available trusted peer of the source user.
Increasing the graph size and consequently the P2P network leads to higher overhead, but the social-
based system exhibits half the overhead of random, both in simulations and in real deployment.
Lesson 2: Increasing the service availability (through data replication) and number of users/peer
does not always improve the response time and message overhead. In general, since requests for a
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user can be fulfilled by any of her trusted peers, we observe that increasing the data availability
by a factor of 3, and correspondingly increasing the number of users per peer, improves the end-
to-end performance by up to 25% and reduces the message overhead by ∼30%. This performance
gain is due to two reasons. First, having more user data on each peer allows more requests to com-
plete with fewer network hops. Second, given peer churn and vulnerable P2P communication, more
service availability per user means more alternative trusted peers to contact for a request to be ful-
filled faster. However, when applying K=5 and N=50, we observe reduced improvements due to
increased workload on each PL peer from the additional users mapped.
Lesson 3: Caching inference results and geographic data decentralization can improve scala-
bility and response time. Our simulations showed that caching leads to 20-40% message overhead
reduction for request execution on larger systems with hundreds of thousands of peers and effec-
tively allows the system to scale easier to larger graphs. Also, in our real deployment, by placing
socially-close communities on random peers, we examined a pessimistic experimental scenario of
longer than expected delays for request execution. However, in reality, we expect neighboring com-
munities placed in geographically-close peers (e.g., same country) instead of random. In fact, in
our simulations we observed that expected network times in a cached, social-based system with
in-country delays, were 4 times smaller than in a non-cached social-based system with random
delays. Given the similar network delay distributions observed in the PL-trace and our deploy-
ment,9 we conjecture that geographic data placement of social groups on peers, in combination
with caching of results, can lead to multiple times shorter response times. Given that social graphs
rarely change [Golbeck 2007], background pre-computation and caching of results should allow the
inference execution to scale easier to hundreds of thousands of peers, as shown in our simulations.
6. MOBILE APPLICATION PERFORMANCE
We validated the usability of Prometheus as a social data management service by developing a
mobile social application, CallCensor, that utilizes the Prometheus inference functions through the
exposed API, under real-time constraints. Past work (ContextPhone [Raento et al. 2005]) described
the ContextContact application which offers cues to the caller about the callee’s social context such
as location, collocation with other people, phone ringer status, etc. Our application builds on these
lessons and allows the callee’s phone to adjust the phone ring based on the owner’s social context
and the social relationship with the caller. We measured its end-to-end performance using a real
multi-graph of 100 users.
The CallCensor application leverages social information received from Prometheus to decide
whether or not to allow incoming calls to go through. For each incoming call, the application queries
Prometheus with a social strength or neighborhood inference request to assess the type of social
connection between the caller and the phone owner. Based on the owner settings (e.g., don’t allow
personal calls while at work), the application decides if the phone should ring, vibrate or silence
upon receiving the call. The application was written in Java for devices running Google Android
OS and was tested on a Nexus One mobile phone from HTC (1GHz CPU, 512MB RAM).
There are multiple scenarios a caller can be connected to the phone’s owner; we tested three:
directly connected within 1 social hop, indirectly connect by 2 social hops, and connected with a
high social strength. We tested each of these scenarios 50 times. For each of them, the ego and
alter were randomly chosen, and the inference request was sent to a random peer. We assumed
users defined ACPs allowing access to all their data, thus enabling requests to proceed over multiple
hops, and consequently stressing the system at maximum possible load. We measured the end-to-
end response time of an inference request submitted to Prometheus. This experiment introduced
additional overhead due to the communication between the mobile application and Prometheus, and
the processing time by the mobile application.
9the PL-trace has an average RTT for random delays 4 times that of in-country delays over 21 countries, and the average
RTT in our deployment for random delays was 6 times that of in-country delays over 35 countries.
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Fig. 5: Real multi-graph with Facebook edges (black dashed lines) and collocation edges (red con-
tinuous lines). Line thickness demonstrates edge weight.
6.1. Social Multi-Graph from Real Traces
The social graph used in the CallCensor application experiments was based on data collected at
NJIT [Pan et al. 2011]. The graph has two types of edges, representing Facebook friends and Blue-
tooth collocation. Mobile phones were distributed to students and collocation data (determined via
Bluetooth addresses discovered periodically by each mobile device) were sent to a server. The same
set of subjects installed a Facebook application to provide their friend lists and participate in a sur-
vey. The user set was small (100 users) compared to the size of the student body (9, 000), therefore
resulting in a somewhat sparse graph. The collocation data have two thresholds of 45 and 90 minutes
for users to have spent together.
While the graph edges were not initially weighted, we applied synthetic weights of 0.1 for “Face-
book” edges, 0.1 for “collocation” of 45 minutes and 0.2 for “collocation” of 90 minutes. For the
mobile application experiments, we consider the “collocation” edges to represent a work relation-
ship, while the “Facebook” edges represent a personal relationship. The user (ego) was assumed to
be in a work environment when another user (alter) called. As shown in Figure 5, the multi-graph
provided for better connectivity between users since neither the “Facebook” nor the “collocation”
graph is connected, but the graph containing both types of edges is. We equally distributed the
NJIT graph with a social mapping on three PL nodes. Splitting this 100 user-graph on 3 PL peers
implies a similar ratio of users/peer as before, while testing 1 and 2 hop inference execution on a
real multi-graph.
6.2. Experimental Results
Figure 6 presents the performance for the requests sent by CallCensor, for each of the three scenar-
ios examined. The results show the time spent by the requests only in Prometheus and the overall
time needed by the CallCensor to request and handle a response. We first observe that the results
meet the real-time constraint of the application: the response must arrive before the call is forwarded
to the voicemail of the callee (we used the default voicemail time setting). Second, we notice that
the application itself introduced a significant overhead: for example, as much as 100% in the 1–hop
neighborhood and 50% in the 2–hop neighborhood and social strength, due to both communica-
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Fig. 6: CDF of average end-to-end response time for CallCensor, under three social inference func-
tion requests: 1, 2 hops neighborhood and social strength (SocS).
tion overhead and execution time on the mobile phone. Third, we confirm the similarity of the
social strength results with the neighborhood for 2 social hops, as found in the first set of experi-
ments. Forth, the 2-hop request results using this small social graph are similar in performance with
the larger 1000-user graph used before (social mapping, 30 users/peer). In particular, more than
80% of requests finished within 5 seconds in both setups, which leads us to believe that similar
performance of the mobile application could be expected in a larger social graph distributed over
hundreds of peers.
7. RESILIENCE TO MALICIOUS ATTACKS
In this section, we discuss how the design characteristics of Prometheus enable the system to defend
against attacks (1) at the infrastructure level, (2) at the social graph level, (3) at the service level,
and (4) at the application level, or mitigate their effects on users.
Attacks at the infrastructure level may attempt to install malcode in the system’s software or
firmware, or to hinder access with a denial of service attack. Both centralized and decentralized
systems are vulnerable to such attacks. A decentralized system, however, can be the target of ad-
ditional infrastructure attacks, such as to disrupt system communications (routing of messages be-
tween peers) or content storage. Solutions to eclipse and other infrastructure attacks in DHT-based
systems (such as Prometheus) have been discussed in the past [Urdaneta et al. 2011].
Attacks on the social graph aim to manipulate the graph structure by modifying edges, creating
new edges with malicious users10 or bias honest users to reciprocate edges to attackers.11 A re-
ciprocal edge to an attacker, as implemented in most OSNs, grants him partial or complete access
to the victim’s data (i.e., online profile and personal information) and can be used for email spam
and phishing campaigns.12 Centralized systems have complete knowledge of the social graph and
monitor its changes to detect such malicious activity (e.g., Facebook Immune System [Stein et al.
2011]). However, the effectiveness of their defense systems is currently limited against socialbot
attacks [Boshmaf et al. 2011]. Prometheus’ directed, labeled and weighted social graph is more dif-
ficult to manipulate in such attacks because, while it is relatively easy to create an edge from the
attacker to the victim, creating a useful reciprocal edge with appropriate label and weight is not in
10http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp the-real-face-of-koobface.pdf
11http://ca.olin.edu/2008/realboy/index.html
12http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/social-network-attacks-surge
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the attacker’s control. In the future, Prometheus could employ techniques such as SybilLimit [Yu
et al. 2008] to reduce further the probability to reciprocate edges to sybil attackers.
Attacks at the service level attempt to manipulate inferences on the social graph, such as drop
requests or modify results. Such attacks are more effective on decentralized systems than in centrally
controlled systems due to the different level of guarantees that distributed, user-contributed peers
can provide. We experimentally elaborate more on attacks at this level in the next subsections.
Finally, at the application level, malicious services collect and use social data for spamming,
stalking, etc. Users in centralized systems have typically limited or no control on the exposure
and use of their data from such 3rd party services, as seen by numerous email spam and phishing
campaigns, cyberstalking cases,13 as well as collection of private information from online social
aggregators,14 or the NSA.15 Instead, Prometheus enables users to control access of applications
to their social data via fine-grained ACPs. In addition, application designers can make use of the
Prometheus API to reduce attacks on their users’ data. For example, an email application could filter
spam by allowing incoming emails only when the receiver is reciprocating an edge to the sender with
appropriate label and weight, and even using knowledge from the receiver’s 2-hop neighborhood to
inform the filtering decision [Garriss et al. 2006].
Prometheus is useful to user applications only if it can support an unhindered execution of in-
ference functionalities on users’ social data. In the next subsections we discuss in more detail and
present simulation results that show how the socially-aware design of Prometheus increases the
system resilience to attacks at the service level which attempt to manipulate inference requests.
7.1. Attacks at the Service Level
As explained in Section 4, if a peer does not have the social data necessary to fulfill a request locally,
it sends secondary requests to the appropriate peers. The number of such secondary peers contacted
depends on the request type and number of hops requested (which can translate to multiple P2P
network hops) and how the social graph is decentralized on peers. Further, in a system that protects
user privacy such as Prometheus, a requestor cannot distinguish how and from which peer any
given item entered the result set. Consequently, for Alice to mount a successful attack at the service
level, she would have to control intermediary peers, which have the opportunity to drop incoming
requests, modify intermediate results, or change the parameters of secondary requests sent to new
peers. Moreover, if malicious peers collude (e.g., they are all owned or have been compromised
by Alice), they can increase the magnitude of the attack at the service level. Eavesdropping is
disallowed due to encrypted P2P communication. Traffic analysis could reveal some characteristics
of the network such as central peers that handle multiple requests. However, due to the chain-type
of inference execution and the encrypted messages, an attacker would not be able to infer if they are
requests, replies, etc., what type of requests (e..g, neighborhood), or what were the results returned.
We experimentally investigate how the socially-aware design of Prometheus increases its re-
silience to these attacks by measuring the opportunity of peers to influence (and thus manipulate)
results when serving a neighborhood inference request. We define a peer’s influence on requests as
the fraction of requests that the peer serviced over the total number of requests issued in the system.
A peer’s influence on a request increases with the number of hops the graph is traversed, since,
probabilistically, there are more chances for the peer to participate in the request’s execution. We
do not consider the first hop (i.e., the source peer) of a request as malicious, since if it is, no results
can be considered legitimate. In these experiments we consider the worst case scenario where all
requests traverse the whole graph: no restriction of the social edge label or weight, all edges are
reciprocal, and users define ACPs allowing access to all their data.
We extended our preliminary work [Blackburn et al. 2011] with two sets of experiments to assess
the influence of peers in inference execution on real social graphs. During the experiments, an n-
13http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2011.pdf
14http://www.spokeo.com/
15http://www.theguardian.com/world/prism
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hop neighborhood request was performed for all egos (users) in the social graph. This request was
submitted to ego’s peer, i.e. peer P0, which could fulfill requests regarding information only about
users mapped to P0. For users in subsequent social hops from ego that P0 did not have social data,
P0 found the peers storing the particular users’ data and submitted secondary requests to be fulfilled
by those peers. Each time a peer served a secondary request, we increased the peer’s influence.
Similarly with Section 5.1.1, we validated our simulator for the influence measurements and report
only statistically significant results.
7.2. Peer Influence in Independent Peer Attacks
In our first set of experiments we studied the peer influence on five graphs based on real traces from
diverse application domains, such as P2P file sharing (Gnutella), email communications (Enron),
trust on consumer reviews (Epinions) and friendships in a news website (Slashdot). The social
properties of these networks16 have been studied in the past [Gomez et al. 2008; Leskovec et al.
2009; Ripeanu et al. 2002] and represent possible activities that could connect Prometheus users
with social edges of different labels.
We considered all networks bidirectional with equally-weighted edges and used only the largest
connected component of each graph to ensure reachability between all users. For social mappings
of users to peers for the real graphs, we identified communities with the recursive-based Louvain
method used in [Kourtellis and Iamnitchi 2011], for average community size N=10, 50 and 100,
while maintaining the replication factor to one (K=1). Due to space, we present results for three of
the networks and one of the community sizes but discuss lessons based on all networks and setups;
all results can be found in [Kourtellis 2012]. We also compare results with the 1k-user synthetic
graph used in Section 5. Table III presents a summary of the networks and communities found.
Table III: Description of real graphs used (same graph metrics as in Table II).
Dataset Nodes Edges AD CC ED C ACS
Gnutella04 10 876 39 994 7.4 0.006 5.4 1087 10.0
Gnutella31 62 561 147 878 4.7 0.006 6.7 6255 10.0
Slashdot 82 168 504 230 12.3 0.060 4.7 8206 10.0
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Fig. 7: Peer influence profile: CDF of the average peer influence for the 1000-user synthetic graph,
the Gnutella04 graph (10.9K users), the Gnutella31 graph (62.6K users) and the Slashdot graph
(82.2K users), for random (RM ) and social mapping (SM ) of 10 users/peer, for 2 and 3 hop re-
quests. (Note: axes in log scale).
16Source: http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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Fig. 8: Peer influence profile: CDF of the average peer influence for the 1000-user synthetic graph,
the Gnutella04 graph (10.9K users), the Gnutella31 graph (62.6K users) and the Slashdot graph
(82.2K users), for random (RM ) and social mapping (SM ) of 50 users/peer, for 2 and 3 hop re-
quests. (Note: axes in log scale).
Figures 7 and 8 plot the CDF of the average influence of peers in 2 and 3 hop requests, for 10 and
50 users/peer respectively, for the Gnutella04, Gnutella31 and Slashdot graphs and the 1000-user
synthetic graph used in Section 5. The results for all values of N and social graphs can be found
in [Kourtellis 2012]. From these results we formulate the following lessons.
Lesson 4: The social mapping reduces the average opportunity of peers to influence requests
by 20–50% for 2-hop requests and by 10–40% for 3-hop requests in comparison to the random
mapping. Figures 7- 8 show that the random mapping leads to an overall increased opportunity for
peers to influence requests, in comparison to the social mapping, regardless of the type and size of
graph, and number of hops. This is because in a social mapping, socially-close users are mapped
to the same peers, increasing the likelihood that more hops are served locally when compared to
randomly mapped users on peers. This implies that a social mapping results in fewer secondary
requests sent in the system (regardless of the way communities were identified and mapped on
peers). Furthermore, increasing the community size (not shown here) increases a peer’s influence
on requests, regardless of the type of mapping (random or social), since more requests are served
by that peer for each of its users. However, this influence increase is more prominent in the random
than in the social mapping.
Lesson 5: The peer influence is affected more by the request’s number of hops than the type of
mapping, topology or the size of the distributed social graph. Malicious peers are more effective
in small networks, as they can serve and thus influence a larger portion of requests. For example,
Gnutella04 exhibited a similar influence profile with Gnutella31 but with higher influence values.
Thus, even though they have the same topological characteristics, in the 6 times larger Gnutella31
peers have less opportunity to serve (portions of) requests. However, if we compare different-hop
requests, in our tested graphs and values of users/peer, the average peer influence was higher by 1–2
orders of magnitude in the 3-hop requests in comparison to 2-hops.
Lesson 6: Social-based networks force peers to smaller influence values due to higher clustering
coefficient and lower path length. Slashdot (and similarly Enron and Epinions [Kourtellis 2012]),
have a different network structure than Gnutella, i.e., a higher clustering coefficient that reduces
diameter and average path length, but also increases the average degree. In such social-based net-
works, the peer influence spreads to a wider range (an order of magnitude smaller values), because
queries cover smaller parts of the graph due to higher clustering coefficient and reduced path length.
For these influence values (<0.1), the social mapping is more beneficial than random, since it forces
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requests to touch fewer peers. However, in higher influence values (>0.1), the social mapping per-
forms similarly to random due to the presence of “hot-spot” peers.
Lesson 7: The power-law nature of social graphs allows the formation of “hot-spot” peers who
serve many requests, thus becoming attractive targets to attacks. We observe that in some of the
networks, community sizes and n-hop requests, the social mapping can lead to a wider distribu-
tion of peer influence values, when compared to the random mapping. This is particularly true in
larger networks and community sizes. However, there are highly influential peers who control more
requests flowing through the P2P topology than the average peer in both types of mappings. The
emergence of such peers can be attributed to the power-law nature of social networks, where users
of high social degree centrality attract a lot of the information flow and requests, regardless of the
type of mapping enforced in the system. Even though such users are closely connected with each
other [Shi et al. 2008] and are more likely to be mapped together on the same peer in the social than
in the random mapping, in our experiments we observed that the random mapping also leads to such
highly influential peers, especially in the larger graphs such as Epinions and Slashdot.
To tackle the issue of potential attacks, peers can independently monitor the centrality they ac-
quire in the P2P topology based on their users’ centrality [Kourtellis and Iamnitchi 2011, 2013].
Consequently, a peer can drop requests from new users to store their social data and encourage
them to seek alternative peers, if the new data would create uneven distribution of workload for the
particular peer and lead to potential attacks. Thus, these hot-spot peers can be identified early and
targeted for quarantine in the early stages of a malware outburst or other attack. Alternatively, they
can be used to disseminate more efficiently security software patches to handle a malicious attack.
7.3. Peer Influence in Peer Collusion Attacks
In the second set of experiments, we investigated the peer influence when peers collude with each
other, e.g., they are all controlled by Alice. We assume that Alice attempts to recruit peers for her
botnets in two ways. First, she targets random peers to control different parts of the network; we
refer to this as random collusion (RC). Second, she targets a cluster of peers that serve a particular
portion of the graph, e.g., neighboring groups in a large professional organization; we refer to this
as social collusion (SC), since users mapped on the attacked peers are connected over social edges.
For these experiments we used the largest network Slashdot and the social and random mappings
with average community size of 10 users/peer. We seeded the collusion by selecting 1% random
peers (i.e., 1% independent attackers). Then, we iterated over these peers to expand their collusion
sets depending on the collusion type (social or random), until the overall malicious peers (fractionC
of all peers) across all collusion sets amounted to a specific portion of the total network. We varied
C in the range of 10%, 20%..., 50%.
Figure 9 shows the average influence of peers for 10 repetitions of each of these scenarios. We
observe that the average influence measured on collusion groups (SC or RC) is always higher than
the average influence of their individual peer members when not colluding with each other (NC).
From these results we draw several lessons.
Lesson 8: Social mappings are more resilient to collusion attacks than random mappings. Col-
lusion of peers increases their effectiveness when attacking the system. However, a random distri-
bution of the social graph onto peers (RM ) forces requests to access data from more peers than
in a social distribution (SM ), and thus allows peers to control and influence a higher portion of
inference requests, either if they are colluding or not.
Lesson 9: Social peer collusions are less effective on social than random mappings. In the social
collusion, the attack targets neighboring peers (i.e., their users are directly connected in the social
graph). In this case, the attacker achieves lower peer influence on requests if the graph was mapped
with a social than a random mapping. Overall, the difference between social and random collusion
is limited to ∼2% in 2 hops, ∼10% in 3 hops and ∼5% in 4 hops.
Lesson 10: The peer influence is affected more by the request’s number of hops than the collusion
size. In all tested collusion types and graph mappings, increasing the number of colluding peers
increases the average peer influence of an attacker. However, the peer influence value depends more
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Fig. 9: Average peer influence for random (RM ) and social mapping (SM ) of Slashdot, for 10
users/peer, 2–4 hop requests and varying range of social (SC) or random collusion (RC). We
compare with the no-collusion (NC) scenario. Y-bars show 95% confidence intervals.
on the number of hops the request will traverse the graph, than the collusion size: from less than
10% for 2 hops to more than 90% for 4 hops (as also shown in the previous experiments). We
also observe highest gains on the rate of change of peer influence for a malicious attacker at 3 hop
requests than 2 or 4 hops (the 4 hop requests cover most of Slashdot).
Overall, our experiments demonstrated that the social mapping of user data onto Prometheus
peers leads to improved resilience to attacks during request execution, since peers have reduced
opportunity to manipulate requests and their results, in comparison to a random mapping (e.g.,
using a DHT). Furthermore, we observed that a social peer collusion can be more effective than a
random peer collusion. Therefore, users should carefully select their trusted peers, since unverified
peers from their social neighborhood can potentially have increased influence on their requests than
random peers. Finally, there should be default ACPs to control the number of (social and network)
hops that requests can travel in the system, since this parameter is more important with respect to
peer influence and data exposure, than the extend of peer collusion.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We presented Prometheus, a P2P service that provides decentralized, user-controlled, social data
management. Its directed, weighted, labeled and multi-edged social graph offers an aggregate rep-
resentation of users’ social state. It enables novel socially-aware applications to mine this rich graph
via an API that executes social inferences, while enforcing user-defined access control policies.
We evaluated the Prometheus design via large-scale simulations and a prototype deployment on a
large distributed testbed with realistic workloads. Prometheus is designed as an application-oriented
platform. Thus, we tested its end-to-end performance and showed that deadlines set by application
requests can be met without significant reduction in the quality of results. Additionally, we imple-
mented a proof-of-concept mobile social application that utilizes Prometheus functionalities under
real-time deadlines. Further, we investigated the resilience of Prometheus to attacks by malicious
users or peers, and established that the socially-aware design of Prometheus constitutes a resilient
P2P system that can withstand malicious peer attacks more effectively than solutions that randomly
distribute users’ data onto peers.
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